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Since Chalmers (1995) seminal paper on con-
sciousness, many have argued for or against 
its hard problem - subjective experience. Earp 
(2012) agrees there is a hard problem, but ar-
gues against Chalmers’ supposed proposition 
that positing phenomenal properties of experi-
ence, or qualia, as brute counts as explaining 
them. Unfortunately, this is not Chalmers’ pro-
posal. Chalmers does indeed propose that qua-
lia should be taken as fundamental, but he does 
not argue that their nonreducible metaphysical 
status confers their explanation. Instead, taking 
them to be brute is necessary to begin to empiri-
cally study and understand the psychophysical 
laws governing the relations between physical 
mechanisms and their corresponding nonphysi-
cal phenomenal properties. Chalmers makes this 
point clear in the paper Earp cites heavily from:
“Where there is a fundamental property, there are fun-
damental laws. A nonreductive theory of experience will 
add new principles to the furniture of the basic laws of 
nature. These basic principles will ultimately carry the ex-
planatory burden in a theory of consciousness” (Chalmers, 
1995, p.210)
Earp wants an answer to why something physical 
can produce something experiential, and states 
that to explain something is “(at minimum) to 
give an account of its nature or existence by re-
ferring to some other existing thing, reductively 
or otherwise” (Earp, 2012, p.18). But this is ex-
actly what Chalmers proposes to do. Experience 
would be explained by referring to laws, or prin-
ciples, that nonreductively, but systematically 
link neural activity to experience.  As for why 
something physical can produce experience, 
Chalmers offers the beginning of an answer with 
his principle of organizational invariance, stat-
ing “any two systems with the same fi ne-grained 
functional organization will have qualitatively 
identical experiences” (Chalmers, 1995, p.214).
It is something about the function neural activ-
ity instantiates that causes experience. Does the 
principle tell us what overarching thing about 
function is relevant, or why certain functional 
states like hunger or fear cause their respec-
tive experiences? No. But we should not expect 
Chalmers to provide those answers a priori. 
These research questions demand empirical an-
swers.
Earp makes reference to Chalmers’ psycho-
physical principle of structural coherence – the 
structure of experience parallels the structure of 
awareness. But Earp considers this an “easy” 
explanation, unlike his sought after “hard” ex-
planation for why something physical produces 
something experiential.  This distinction is point-
less, as I have argued Chalmers is offering the 
explanation Earp seeks, but it is nascent. Even if 
Earp accepts this point, he may still consider the 
laws Chalmers proposes as not offering “epis-
temic satisfaction,” the feeling of understanding 
(Campbell, 2009). Epistemic satisfaction is trou-
blesome as the feeling is above all subjective. 
I could fi nd that psychophysical laws perfectly 
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explain experience and exclaim “Eureka!”
As for Earp’s appeal to epistemic satisfaction, 
he does not suggest how a satisfactory explana-
tion would look like. Secondly, should the epis-
temic satisfaction we expect for reductive ex-
planations of physical phenomena generalize to 
nonreductive explanations of nonphysical qua-
lia? There is no reason to think so, especially if 
epistemic satisfaction usually applies to cases of 
physical reductionism. Indeed, why should we 
insofar as experience seems to be the set of phe-
nomena most resistant to explanation – hence, 
the hard problem.
Since Chalmers endorses the existence of psy-
chophysical laws, could these laws be explana-
tory? More generally, do laws have explanatory 
power?  To the extent that Chalmers’ proposed 
psychophysical laws will supervene on physical 
and phenomenal properties, we could approach 
their explanatory power from a Humean per-
spective. Loewer (2012) and Hicks and van Els-
wyk (2015) have argued that laws scientifi cally 
“explain their instances by showing their natural 
unity and similarity” (p.436).
If experience is nonphysical and psychophysi-
cal laws are offered as an explanation, then is 
seems that we can indeed explain experience. 
Hence, we should adjust our expectations for 
epistemic satisfaction – that is, nonreducible 
psychophysical laws seem capable of being 
epistemically satisfactory.
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